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Executive Summary
The majority of young people work in low-productivity jobs,
most often in  agriculture or in self-employment or household
enterprises, with low earnings and little security.
1
Youth employment is a pressing challenge throughout sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) today. With a median age of only 24 pro-
jected by 2050, the UN estimates that Africa’s 15-24 year-old
age group will swell by about six million each year for the next
decade. Most young people in the region work in low-income
and low-productivity jobs. Improving these outcomes is critical,
given the region’s large youth bulge and the potential devel-
opment spillovers that go along with a productive and
engaged youth cohort.
The purpose of this paper is to take stock of what we know
about youth employment in sub-Saharan Africa and to identify
research that could address policy-relevant knowledge gaps. It
is based on a review of the available grey and academic litera-
ture, from both international and regional sources.
The African context
Standard measures, beginning with definitions of youth, fall
short in illustrating the scope, magnitude, and nature of the
youth employment challenge in the unique context of sub-
Saharan Africa. The conventional age range for “youth” 
(15-24 years) captures the transition into employment for 
most young Africans. However, for some, the challenges of
transition extend into the late 20s or even beyond.
Traditional conceptions of “employment” covering wage
and salary work, particularly in the formal sector, capture only
a small percentage of young African workers. The majority
work in agriculture or in self-employment or micro/household
enterprises. Only in the region’s middle-income countries is a
modern wage sector significant. For this reason and the lack of
a formal safety net, standard labour market indicators tell us
relatively little about the state of youth employment in most 
of the region. Most young workers, who have relatively little
 education, experience underemployment (subsistence wages,
no benefits or protection, low productivity, etc.) rather than
open unemployment. It is only among the better-educated
minority that unemployment is prevalent.
The jobs structure and challenges for youth vary across SSA.
In low-income, agrarian economies, employment in low-pro-
ductivity, subsistence agriculture dominates and the immediate
priority is to raise farming productivity. The other large cate-
gory is resource-rich economies; here, the challenge is to see
wealth from resources translate into jobs in the secondary and
tertiary sectors. As country income levels rise, open unemploy-
ment becomes more of an issue for youth because of weak
labour demand, especially for skilled workers. And in the
region’s conflict-affected countries, jobs challenges are
 pervasive and difficult.
These observations suggest some basic principles 
to guide policy. 
• As noted above, conventional labour market measures, like
unemployment, are often not the best indicators on which
to base targeted interventions. 
• Low levels of educational achievement and skills gaps limit
the employment prospects for many young people. So, in
addition to job experience, various types of skills develop-
ment programs, from second-chance education to technical
training, are important. 
• The main employment obstacles for young people often lie
outside the usual scope of labour market programming.
Where the majority of youth work in farming, meaningful
improvements in their livelihoods will require a focus on
productivity and innovation in agriculture. Where large
numbers are self-employed or in household enterprises,
access to credit and a friendly business environment may
be decisive factors. 
• Context matters:  the nature of employment challenges
 differs across the region, which means that policy priorities
must vary as well.
Current interventions
This paper summarizes what is known about existing interven-
tions to expand employment and livelihood opportunities for
young people in sub-Saharan Africa. While there are significant
knowledge gaps, especially in terms of program evaluation,
some observations can be made from the literature:
Job creation initiatives for youth have not played a big role in
the region. While public works have been widely used, they
have typically been designed as a safety net for poor or vulner-
able households rather than as an intervention to increase
youth employment. Wage subsidies have not been common,
outside of South Africa. However, by reducing labour costs,
they may offer some promise since they can partially mitigate
the risks employers face in hiring youth.
Skills development programs are the most common type of
intervention to support youth employment in the region. The
quality of these programs is often a concern, though rigorous
evaluations are scarce. International evidence highlights the
importance of the private sector working with government 
on determining skill needs and how they can best be met.
Given the low level of education attained by many young
 people, remedial education and second-chance programs 
are also important.
Employment services play a limited role in African countries.
While young job seekers are certainly constrained by informa-
tion gaps and a lack of effective matching between labour sup-
ply and demand, employment services tend to be more useful
to skilled young people seeking work in the formal wage sector.
ICTs and globalization may present new ways of addressing  
the need for better information and intermediation in 
labour markets.
There is very little evidence on the effectiveness of entrepre-
neurship support programs to help young Africans start their
own businesses or improve their livelihoods in micro-enterprises.
However, this is a promising area for policy intervention since
so many young people have little choice but to create their
own job. The obstacles they face, notably access to credit and
know-how, are well understood and, in principle, can be
addressed through financial and technical assistance.
Agricultural productivity and income interventions will be impor-
tant for the region’s youth for the foreseeable future, even
though they have not normally been considered as youth
employment strategies. There is very little evidence on how
these interventions can improve livelihoods for youth in the
sector. However, research indicates that land reform, skills
development, access to credit, and better infrastructure 
would all contribute to this goal.
Knowledge gaps and research needs
What research would be important to fill knowledge gaps and
inform policies and interventions to improve employment and
livelihood opportunities for young people in sub-Saharan
Africa? This paper highlights priority areas for further research.
1. Data on youth employment. More informative analysis will
require better data from countries throughout the region.
This includes more regular and representative data from
households and enterprises of all sizes, as well as panel
data, which allows researchers to track changes over time.
2. School-to-work transition and youth employment dynamics.
This would include analysis of movements between school
and work, across labour market states, and between jobs. 
A more robust analysis would also require panel data.
3. Employment for particular groups. How do gender, disability,
ethnicity, and other social and cultural markers affect
employability, employment experiences, barriers, and
 effective interventions for specific groups?
4. Structural change in employment. The structure of SSA
economies — the sectors that provide employment and the
prospects for labour mobility — has been relatively static.
What has hindered the process of structural change in the
region and what is the potential for accelerated change to
create better future employment opportunities for the
region’s youth?
5. Program evaluations. Interventions to support youth
employment are hampered by a lack of evidence on their
effectiveness. Building an extensive body of program
 evaluation findings will be essential to better inform
 programming.
6. Role of the private sector and other non-governmental actors.
What are the contributions and effectiveness of new initia-
tives sponsored by private-sector enterprises, foundations,
and NGOs around economic opportunities for SSA’s youth?
7. Innovative programming. This paper concludes by suggest-
ing a number of areas where knowledge generated by
research could inform the design of more innovative and
effective programming to address youth employment.
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The employment picture is a challenging one for youth in sub-
Saharan Africa. The majority of young people work in low-
productivity jobs, most often in agriculture or in self-employ-
ment or household enterprises, with low earnings and little
security. The region’s educated youth may have better jobs
when they do get employment but open unemployment for
this group is a significant concern.
The question of youth employment on the continent is cru-
cial for several reasons. First, the social return on jobs for youth
is especially relevant to the region’s future living standards,
productivity, and social cohesion. Policymakers are aware of
this — and of the costs of young people not working or with-
out good jobs — so youth employment is a priority issue virtu-
ally everywhere. Demography is the second reason why the
stakes are high. SSA is the youngest region in the world, with a
large youth bulge that will continue to expand in the future.
The median age is 18 now, and will only climb to 24 by 2050.
The UN estimates that the size of the 15-24 year-old age group
will increase by about six million annually over the next
decade. This youthful profile offers the potential for a “demo-
graphic dividend”, such as the one that benefited East Asia in
the late twentieth century, but this is not the most likely
 scenario if various constraints in SSA’s current situation are
 projected into the future.
The jobs challenges for youth vary across the region, which 
we can categorize roughly as follows:
• In low-income, agrarian economies, the immediate priority is
to raise farming productivity while establishing the founda-
tions for better off-farm opportunities in the future. 
• The other numerically large country category is resource-
rich economies, where the wealth from resources needs to
translate into many more new opportunities in industry 
or services. 
• In the region’s middle-income countries, the priority is to
increase labour demand, especially for skilled workers, in
modern wage sectors. 
• Jobs challenges are pervasive and difficult in the region’s
conflict-affected countries.
A wide range of interventions are needed to address these
formidable and diverse challenges. In some cases, appropriate
policy responses involve active labour market programs that
upgrade the skills of young people and improve their access to
jobs. However, many young Africans seeking better jobs and
livelihoods are constrained by a lack of access to credit, land, or
productivity-enhancing infrastructure, or by political or social
instability, which deter investment and entrepreneurship. In
these cases, policymakers need to consider interventions that fall
outside the conventional limits of employment programming.
Evidence-based research can play an important role in iden-
tifying the barriers young people face in finding employment
and assessing the likely effectiveness of potential policy actions.
In the next two sections, we review the existing evidence on
youth employment in SSA and interventions to support better
jobs for young people. In the final section, we identify a num-
ber of important knowledge gaps where research could inform
effective actions to improve economic opportunities for the
region’s youth.
INTRODUCTION















There is a growing body of empirical research on youth
employment in sub-Saharan Africa. This analysis has benefited
from new research efforts that have somewhat alleviated the
data situation, though it is still not as strong as in other devel-
oping regions. Important gaps remain, for example, in covering
agriculture and the non-agricultural informal sector, disaggre-
gating employment outcomes by key variables such as gender,
and getting reliable estimates over time. The evidence base is
uneven as well: it is strong in some parts of the region, most
notably South Africa, but very limited in other parts, such as
the Francophone countries of West Africa. Nonetheless, a fairly
consistent picture emerges from the literature about the broad
lines of youth employment in SSA today. This picture is sum-
marized in this section. The region is now going through signif-
icant economic changes, which are giving rise to different
views on how SSA’s employment profile may be transformed 
in the future.
2.1. Defining “youth employment”
We adopt a broad definition of “employment” in this paper.1
Historically, employment has often been equated with wage
and salary jobs, usually in the formal sector. This is due in part
to developed-country norms and the limitations of available
data. However, most people in SSA do not work in an office, 
a mine, or a factory with an employer, a contract, and a pay-
cheque. The majority work on farms, in very small family enter-
prises, or in some form of self-employment. So a meaningful
conception of employment in the region needs to encompass
these different types of jobs, the vast majority of which are in
the informal sector. Indeed, broad definitions are becoming
more common in the SSA literature.2
The definition of “youth” is also not straightforward. The
underlying concept is clear: the transition period between
childhood and (complete) adulthood. This transition applies to
many dimensions of life including, for most, family formation
and establishing an independent residence, exercising citizen-
ship rights and duties, and leaving school for work. Interna-
tional norms typically define “youth” as the 15-24 year-old age
group (e.g., United Nations, 2004).3 And this definition is the
most prevalent one used in major research studies on youth
employment in SSA (e.g., Filmer and Fox, 2014; AfDB et al., 2014).
However, there are other views on who belongs in the youth
cohort. Some international organizations and many govern-
ments in the region have extended the upper boundary
beyond 24 years of age. The African Youth Charter defines
youth as between 15-35 years (UNECA, 2011).4 According to
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA),
“[t]his  age definition also constitutes an acceptable compro-
mise among African countries, most of which have defined
young people as individuals aged between 29 and 40 in their
national youth policies” (UNECA, 2011: 69). Indeed, a number
of countries, including Nigeria, South Africa, and Rwanda, set
the upper boundary for youth at 35 years (Makgetla, 2014).
This view of a youth cohort that extends beyond 24 has also
been adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO)
in its recent work on youth transitions into employment which
covers 15-29 year-olds (ILO, 2013). However, the ILO has contin-
ued to use the conventional 15-24 year definition in its standard
analysis of youth employment indicators.
What do we know about youth employment in SSA?2
1 The question of “what is a job”, and the rationale for a broad definition, was
 discussed in some depth in the World Bank’s 2013 World Development Report 
on Jobs (World Bank, 2012: 63-66).
2 Prominent examples are the major data-intensive studies on youth employment 
in the region carried out by the World Bank (Filmer and Fox, 2014) and the multi-
agency research collaboration reported in the 2012 African Economic Outlook
(AfDB et al., 2012).
3 Sometimes, the lower bound of the “youth” category has been set at age 12 
(e.g., World Bank, 2006) or even 10 (UNFPA, 2014). However, when it comes to
employment, it is rare to see the starting point for youth below age 15 because 
of child labour laws and conventions.
4 The Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2011: 69) explains this definition as
follows: “This definition views young people within the African context and is based
on Africa’s development realities. While the age bracket set in the Charter continues
to prompt vigorous discussion, it is a position that was agreed upon by African
young people, experts and ministers, endorsed by heads of State and agreed as a
reflection of the challenges faced by African youth in effectively integrating into












So how should youth be defined for the purposes of under-
standing and addressing youth employment in SSA? There are
clearly trade-offs involved in where the upper boundary is set.
Extending it to 29 or even 34 makes sense from the perspec-
tive that full transition into adulthood can be a protracted
process. Getting a stable job can take a long time and, not
unrelated to this, more young people are waiting longer to
form families. And, as we have seen, an extended definition
also corresponds to how many national governments and
donors define youth for planning and policy purposes. But a
higher upper boundary risks losing sight of the issues specific
to youth, as distinct from the adult population at large. This is
especially relevant in sub-Saharan Africa with a very young age
profile. Extending the definition can result in “youth” account-
ing for a large share of the working-age population (WAP). 
If the upper boundary is 29, the youth category represents
slightly more than half of the region’s WAP, and if it is extended
to 34, the share rises to almost two-thirds (Figure 1). At this
point, the youth labour force starts to approximate the total
labour force and youth employment issues might be better
thought of simply as employment issues. 
Defining “youth” is complicated. Settling on a definition can
be a judgement call, and in many ways it is context-specific.
But it also can be informed by empirical evidence. For example,
how do education and employment patterns evolve with age,
and at what point do they stabilize and start to look similar to
adult patterns? This, of course, is the most direct issue within
the context of this paper on youth employment. But the transi-
tion from childhood to adulthood is multi-dimensional, so
other things could be informative as well, such as when fami-
lies are formed and when young people start to participate as
citizens. In Annex 1, we present just a few pieces of evidence
that address these questions. 
While much of the empirical evidence we have reviewed
suggests that the conventional definition (15-24 years) is
broadly appropriate in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, other
evidence suggests an extension to the late 20s may be justified
in some contexts.
2.2. Demographic trends
SSA is the youngest region in the world, with a large youth
bulge that will continue into the future. The median age is 18
now — seven years younger than South Asia’s, the second
youngest region — and will climb only to 24 by 2050.5 The
region’s youth cohort is large, and growing quickly. Between
2000 and 2015, the 15-24 age group grew by 2.6 percent each
year on average. According to UN estimates there are 187 mil-
lion in this age group as of 2015, and this number is projected
to increase at an annual rate of 2.5-2.7 percent, reaching 
244 million in 2025, and 304 million in 2035.
This youthful profile offers the potential for a demographic
dividend, such as was widely recognized as an important con-
tributing factor to East Asia’s rapid economic growth over the
last third of the twentieth century (e.g., Bloom and Williamson,
1998). Certainly, there are many factors that determine whether
a youth bulge can accelerate economic development, includ-
ing whether the conditions for growth and labour demand are
present in the industrial and service sectors. But a necessary
condition for securing the dividend is to reduce the depend-
ency ratio — the ratio of young and old to the working-age
population — which in turn requires significant declines in the
fertility rate. It is unlikely, though, that this will occur in SSA.
The fertility rate, now around 5 births per woman, is only pro-
jected to decline to the 3.5-4 range by the 2030s. As a result,
the dependency ratio will decrease slowly, from the current 
85 to 78 in 2025 and 71 in 2035.6 In contrast, East Asia’s
dependency ratio fell from 76 in 1965 to 48 in 2000, driven by 
a dramatic fertility rate decline from over 5 to 1.5 in this period.
Figure 1. Cumulative distribution of working-age population, 
by age group, sub-Saharan Africa, 2010
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
Source: Based on data from the United Nations World Population Prospects:
The 2012  Revision
5 Unless otherwise noted, all demographic figures come from the United Nations
World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision. Projections cited are based on the
medium-fertility scenario.
6 It should be noted that demographic trends do differ within SSA, with Southern
Africa much more advanced in the fertility transition that the Eastern, Middle, and
Western African sub-regions.
While 15-24 is the most common definition of youth, there
is some evidence a longer horizon may be justified in SSA.
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2.3. Profile of youth employment in SSA
We have already noted the data limitations in the region.
Administrative data are largely non-existent. Enterprise surveys
are generally oriented towards larger firms in the formal sector.
So quantitative research relies almost exclusively on data from
household surveys, such as labour force surveys and living
standards measurement surveys. But even here, the situation 
is far from ideal. According to Szirmai et al. (2013), regularly
repeated labour market surveys are carried out only in Tanzania,
Mauritius, and South Africa. In other countries, these surveys
are irregular and in some cases, they are not national in cover-
age. Where survey data exist, they are often quite dated and
difficult to compare across countries or over time. Many small
surveys carried out have yielded useful analysis, but their rep-
resentativeness is not always clear (Szirmai et al., 2013). Much
of the recent empirical analysis has been based on efforts by
international organizations to harmonize existing household
surveys (e.g., World Bank), use non-traditional survey sources
(e.g., African Economic Outlook, using the Gallup World Polls)7,
or generate new surveys (e.g., the ILO-MasterCard Foundation
School-to-Work Transition Surveys). We rely heavily on these
data sources in this paper.
According to conventional indicators, the youth employ-
ment picture in sub-Saharan Africa actually compares reason-
ably well with other regions (Table 1a). The youth
unemployment rate is below rates elsewhere except South
Asia and East Asia and the ratio between the youth and adult
unemployment rates is the lowest among all regions. 
A higher proportion of young people in SSA participates in
the labour force and is employed than in any other region.
Note, for example, the very large differences in youth employ-
ment rates between sub-Saharan Africa and other developing-
country regions such as the Middle East, North Africa, and
South Asia. Gender differences are also smaller in SSA than in
most other regions. Young men in SSA have lower unemploy-
ment rates and higher employment and participation rates
than young women but the gaps are much smaller than in all
regions except developed countries and East Asia (Table 1b).
Table 1a. Summary indicators, youth employment (15-24 years), by region, 2013p
Sub-Saharan Africa 11.7 2.0 53.6 47.3
Developed economies 17.9 2.3 47.5 39.0
Central and Southeastern Europe/CIS 18.0 2.6 42.0 34.5
East Asia 9.8 2.7 59.3 53.5
Southeast Asia and Pacific 13.3 5.3 52.2 45.2
South Asia 9.4 3.9 40.9 37.0
Latin America and the Caribbean 13.2 2.7 52.4 45.5
Middle East 29.1 3.8 30.2 21.4












7 The Gallup World Polls may be an unusual source of data for labour market analysis,
but it is a useful addition, given the general data limitations in the region. Results
using this source that are cited in this paper include data from 39 SSA countries and
regions. The samples are nationally representative for the population aged 15 and
over, but for the youth population (15-24), results are only indicative at the national
level and are representative at the country-group level.
Using standard measures, youth unemployment in SSA is
lower than in most other developing regions.  But these con-
ventional indicators may be a poor fit in low-income settings.
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT YOUTH EMPLOYMENT IN SSA? 7
Source: (ILO 2013)
However, these conventional indicators do not describe
labour market outcomes very well in low- income settings. 
The statistics shown in Table 1 underestimate the employment
difficulties young Africans face. One reason stems from how
participation, employment, and unemployment are defined in
labour force surveys. Because household incomes are low and
because unemployment insurance and safety nets are non-
existent or very limited at best, few Africans can afford not to
participate in the labour force at all, or to remain completely
unemployed if they do want to work. Moreover, employment
rates do not capture employment quality and under-
employment.
A more nuanced analysis leads to a far less favourable pic-
ture of youth employment in SSA. For the vast majority of
young people, open unemployment may be low but, with pro-
ductivity low, earnings are poor and precarious, (compensated)
hours are limited, and benefits and access to any meaningful
formal social protection are essentially non-existent. For a very
small minority, typically the better-educated (secondary com-
pletion or higher, often coming from relatively high-income
households), job quality may be considerably better but open
unemployment is very high. In short, there are too many bad
jobs for the former group and too few good ones for the latter.
The nature of the labour market, the employment structure,
and employment challenges differ across the region. In many
respects, the differences reflect those for the workforce as a
whole. In low-income countries, about two-thirds of the labour
force is in agriculture, with most of the remainder in household
enterprises (Figure 2). Only about 10 percent of workers are in
wage employment. As country income increases, the composi-
tion of employment shifts out of agriculture and into house-
hold enterprises.8 In the upper-middle-income countries,
essentially in southern Africa, the difference is significant, with
agriculture only a very minor employer and most employment
in the wage sector. Note from Figure 2, however, that the
upper-middle-income category accounts for only a small share
of the region’s labour force, with the large majority in low-
income or resource-rich countries (which share similar employ-
ment structures).
Table 1b: Summary indicators, youth employment (15-24 years), by gender and region, 2013p
M F M F M F M F
Sub-Saharan Africa 11.0 12.5 2.1 1.9 56.0 51.3 49.8 44.9
Developed economies 18.9 16.8 2.4 2.2 49.4 45.4 40.1 37.8
Central and Southeastern Europe/CIS 17.6 18.6 2.5 2.8 49.8 34.0 41.0 27.7
East Asia 11.5 7.9 2.8 2.7 58.3 60.4 51.6 55.6
Southeast Asia and Pacific 12.7 14.2 5.5 5.1 59.1 45.0 51.6 38.7
South Asia 9.2 10.2 4.3 3.2 57.1 23.3 51.9 20.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 11.1 16.3 2.7 2.8 61.9 42.8 55.1 35.8
Middle East 25.2 43.5 4.0 3.2 46.3 13.2 34.6 7.5












8 Household enterprises are informal businesses outside agriculture that are 
“own-account” or self-employment operations, which may have family members
contributing. For a detailed analysis of household enterprises in SSA, see Fox and
Sohnesen (2012).
Open unemployment may be low, but so too are productivity
and earnings, and there are few social protections 
for African youth. 
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The employment challenges facing young people can vary
in these different types of labour markets. Open unemploy-
ment is much more prevalent in middle-income than lower-
income countries (Table 2). In middle-income countries, with
significant wage sectors, unemployment rates as they are con-
ventionally defined may convey useful information on labour
market hardship. In the lower-income countries, where youth
predominantly work in agriculture or in self-employment or
household enterprises, open unemployment is relatively rare
and underemployment is the main issue. But consistent meas-
ures of underemployment are not widely available and, in fact,
there is no consensus on what the best indicator might be.
Probably the most common definition is hours-based, where
underemployment is identified by employment below a
 certain number of hours (e.g., 40 hours in a week) and a will-
ingness to work more hours. However, as Ranis and Gollin (2014)
point out, hours may not be a good indicator of underemploy-
ment because some workers may work very long hours just to
survive. They suggest that underemployment may be better
defined by employment at very low marginal productivity and
earnings, perhaps indicated by the percentage of the work-
force earning less than the minimum wage. Using data from
the 1-2-3 Surveys in Francophone country capital cities, Ranis
and Gollin (2014: Table 2.5) show that the low-wage definition
generates much higher underemployment rates than the
hours-based definition.






























Source: Fox et al. 2013
Note: On the horizontal axis, numbers show size of the labor force, ages 15–64, in each group. 
Resource-rich countries included are Angola, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Nigeria, 
the Republic of Congo, Sudan and Republic of South Sudan, and Zambia. 
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Some researchers capture labour market hardship in low-
income countries by looking at the composition of employ-
ment by employment status. This approach focuses on the
share of workers not in wage employment. These non-wage
forms of employment are associated with higher rates of
poverty and food insecurity than wage employment,9 so they
are often referred to as “vulnerable” employment. Figure 3
shows how the incidence of unemployment and vulnerable
employment among youth varies across a selection of SSA
countries at different income levels. In higher-income coun-
tries like Botswana and especially South Africa, unemployment
predominates but in the lower-income countries, almost all
employment is “vulnerable” while youth unemployment,
 conventionally measured, is extremely low.













Youth unemployment rate (% age group) Vulnerable employment rate (% age group)
Note: Youth defined as 15-24 year-olds
Source: Hamaguchi et al. (2013), based on ILO Key Indicators of the Labour Market
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9 In low-income countries, youth in “vulnerable” employment have the highest level
of food insecurity, not only higher than wage employees but also higher than stu-
dents and the unemployed (AfDB et al., 2013).
10 Our interest here is in how unemployment varies by education within countries,
rather than unemployment rates between countries which are not strictly compa-
rable because of differences between national surveys.
2.4. The role of education
Within countries, education is an important determinant of
what young people do and what labour market challenges
they face. While unemployment rates may differ substantially
between lower- and middle-income countries, better-educated
youth are clearly more likely to be unemployed in both country
groups (Table 2). This reflects the fact that the better-educated
generally are more likely to be in the wage sector, or to be will-
ing to queue for a job in that sector. However, while there is a
positive relationship between education and unemployment
for these two broad groups of countries, Table 2 shows that
most individual countries tend to exhibit one of two general
patterns.10 In several (e.g., Congo, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Niger,
Nigeria, and Uganda), there is a linear relationship, with youth
unemployment rates increasing with more education. In others
(e.g., Ethiopia, Congo, South Africa, Senegal,  Tanzania),
 unemployment peaks for those with secondary attainment 
but declines for those young people with postsecondary 
education.
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However, despite improvements in educational attainment,
most young people in SSA still do not have much education.
About 60 percent of 15-24 year-olds have not gone beyond
 primary school and only about 10% have completed secondary
school (Fox and Filmer, 2014). Schooling is correlated with
where young people work: the majority who have not com-
pleted primary education are employed in agriculture; those
with primary or lower-secondary schooling are likely to be in
household enterprises; with the better-educated in the wage
sector (Fox and Filmer, 2014). So, simply in terms of the magni-
tude of the problem, the dominant issue facing the region’s
youth is not open unemployment but underemployment or,
more specifically, precarious and low-paid employment in
 agriculture and self- employment/household enterprises.
Table 2. Youth unemployment rates by education
No Basic Secondary University/
Data Source Country education education education Vocational Tertiary
Gallup World Poll (2009/10)
Low Income 7.9 12.1 15.9 _ 18.8
Middle Income 22.7 17.5 29.5 – 34.6
National surveys (2002-2007)
Botswana 24.4 33.7 37.8 29.7 33.0
Congo 0.0 39.7 43.4 0.0 47.8
DR Congo 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.8
Egypt 4.9 9.7 51.2 34.2
Ethiopia 1.9 6.9 37.0 21.6 13.5
Ghana 3.2 6.2 14.6 17.2 46.1
Malawi 1.3 0.6 4.5 11.7 23.2
Mali 10.2 18.5 54.1 65.1 85.3
Niger 7.9 16.9 16.1
Nigeria 11.7 15.6 19.7 14.7 21.1
Rwanda 4.6 5.1 20.2 10.7
South Africa 31.4 54.9 54.3 49.7 34.9
Senegal 14.1 25.2 30.2 14.3 6.8
Tanzania 2.3 8.1 32.8 23.4 23.2
Uganda 0.9 2.1 6.3 6.6 19.0
Source: AfDB et al. (2013)
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11 Average annual GDP growth averaged 5.4 percent between 2000 and 2014 
(World Bank, 2015).
12 One potential source of wage jobs could be in labour-intensive, light manufactur-
ing where it has been argued that sustained wage increases in coastal China will
price that region out of this type of production and create new opportunities else-
where in the developing world. However, there are many reasons to doubt that
this will occasion a large shift of manufacturing jobs outside Asia. See
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21646204-asias- dominance-manufac-
turing-will-endure-will-make-development-harder-others-made
13 According to Fox et al. (2013), the main difference is that their forecasts are based
on sub-Saharan Africa specific data while MGI “uses fast-growing developing and
emerging market countries in other continents to project the employment profile”
(p. 21).
14 This list is adapted from the country typology used in the 2013 World
 Development Report on Jobs (World Bank, 2012).
Despite GDP growth, there has been little upgrading 
of employment structures in SSA, toward better jobs 
in services and industry. 
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2.5. The role of economic structure
An important feature of SSA labour markets, and one which
constrains opportunities for youth, is that the structure of
employment has not changed much over recent decades. In
other regions, structural change has been an important driver
of economic development and better jobs. In East Asia, for
example, agriculture has decreased significantly, with industry,
including manufacturing, and services accounting for an
increasing share of output and employment (which has been
upgraded as a result). In SSA, despite fairly strong GDP
growth,11 structural change has been much less important,
with the result that there has not been significant upgrading 
of the employment structure from agriculture to better jobs in
services and industry (Fox et al., 2013). For the better-educated,
this has created some impetus to migrate, given limited oppor-
tunity to use acquired human capital. Economic growth in
many SSA countries has been driven by commodities and
other forces (such as aid) that do not lead to structural change.
Young people are slightly less likely to work in agriculture than
adults, but it is still the major employer for 15-24 year-olds
(AfDB et al., 2013). And, since agricultural productivity is low
(Fox and Filmer 2014), the prospects for good livelihoods in 
the sector are poor.
An important question is what will happen in the future. Will
employment shift towards better jobs in industry and services?
Some observers think so. The McKinsey Global Institute (2012)
contends that Africa, with its young population and improving
education, is now poised to imitate the job-creation successes
that some developing countries in other regions, especially
Asia, have enjoyed. MGI concludes that somewhere between
54 and 72 million stable, wage jobs can be created by 2020.12
However, projections by Fox et al. (2013) are less optimistic.
According to their projections, only 20 percent of the new
entrants to the labour force to 2020 will find wage employ-
ment; this amounts to about 30 million jobs.13
The upper boundary of McKinsey’s job creation estimates
assumes that Africa could potentially create wage-sector jobs
at the pace that East Asian economies did during their period
of rapid structural transformation. That seems overly optimistic,
given the confluence of factors (demographic, infrastructure,
education, policy, etc.) that underpinned the East Asian manu-
facturing miracle and given the fact that light  manufacturing is
becoming less labour-intensive. Even when the forecasts by
Fox et al. (2013) are adjusted to reflect the possibility that wage
employment will increase more rapidly as has happened in
Asia, they still project that wage jobs will not be near the levels
projected by McKinsey.
Over the next ten years, then, they estimate that only about
one-quarter of the region’s young people will find a wage job
and “most young people will end up working where their par-
ents do – in family farms and household enterprises” (Fox and
Filmer, 2014: 5). In any event, to the extent that change does
occur in the structure of jobs, it is more likely to be towards
services other than manufacturing.
2.6. Obstacles to youth employment
Identifying effective interventions depends on understanding
the barriers to more and better jobs for youth. Many of the
most important obstacles are not necessarily youth-specific
and seem to more generally constrain job creation throughout
the region. These include infrastructure (especially electricity
and transportation), governance and corruption, and access to
finance (McKinsey Global Institute, 2012; AfDB et al., 2012).
Obstacles can also be country-specific, depending on the coun-
try’s level of development and other national characteristics.14
• In lower-income, agrarian economies, where most people
continue to be engaged in farming, low productivity in
agriculture is the major constraint to good livelihoods.
 Raising agricultural productivity through measures like land
reform, access to credit, crop selection, and commercializa-
tion is important (McKinsey Global Institute, 2012; Filmer
and Fox, 2013). Over the longer term, creating the founda-
tions for wage jobs in the urban sector will be important.
• In middle-income countries, where urban economies are
developing, the environment for labour- intensive business
and productive micro-enterprises is a constraint. As SSA
countries move up the income scale, improving the busi-
ness climate, regulations, access to finance, and skills
become more important.
• However, a country’s job challenges can be shaped by fac-
tors other than its stage of development. In sub-Saharan
Africa, many countries are “resource-rich” and while this
may generate wealth, it does not create many jobs; here,
the challenge is to effectively use that wealth towards diver-
sification into sectors that are more labour-intensive.
• Conflict-affected countries are also prominent in the region.
This is a very difficult setting for creating jobs, and almost
certainly, the government has to play a direct role until the
country is stable enough to attract private investment.
In these different country contexts, many of the binding
constraints to job creation are factors affecting labour demand.
Throughout the region, then, better youth employment out-
comes will require improvements in the overall environment
for job creation, whether in agriculture, in micro-enterprises, or
in the wage sector. Some constraints on the demand side may
disproportionately affect young people, such as access to
credit, but many apply more generally.
However, issues more specific to youth come more into play
on the labour supply side. Concerns relating to human capital
are important in many country contexts and these supply-side
barriers typically affect young people more than adults. African
employers, like those elsewhere, cite lack of skills and experi-
ence as the main reasons for not hiring young people (AfDB et
al., 2012). Evidence of the lack of skills comes not only from
employer reports but also from high returns to education,
which suggest that there is an unmet demand for skills (Adams
et al., 2013). According to recent estimates by Montenegro and
Patrinos (2014), in fact, returns to education — i.e., the increase
in earnings from an additional year of schooling — are higher
in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other region (Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Average returns to schooling by region
All economies
Middle East & North Africa
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Source: Montenegro and Patrinos (2014)
While gains are being made in education in the region, many
young people remain ill-equipped for the labour market. 
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In sub-Saharan Africa, as elsewhere, education pays off more
for females than for males. Returns are especially high for sec-
ondary and postsecondary schooling. There are also claims of
mismatches between the needs of the labour market and skills
offered by young people. Weaknesses include basic, non-
cognitive, and vocational skills (AfDB et al., 2014). So, although
education indicators are improving in the region, many young
people remain ill-equipped for the labour market. The rele-
vance of skills as an obstacle to youth employment increases
as countries move up the development ladder.
The research suggests a number of other factors that constrain
employment opportunities for youth in the region.
• Poor health and nutrition limit the potential of many young
people (Hamaguchi et al., 2014; Ranis and Gollin, 2014).
Pregnancy, marriage, child rearing, and cultural norms may
inhibit the ability of young women to accumulate skills and
experience in particular (Bertrand and Crepon, 2014).
• Youth have very limited awareness of opportunities in the
labour market because of poor information and inappropriate
expectations. For example, according to the 1-2-3 Surveys in
Francophone country capital cities, 27 percent wanted to get
a job in the public sector yet only 4 percent of new jobs
were created in that sector in the year preceding the survey;
on the other hand, while 82 percent of new jobs were
 created in the informal sector, only 48 percent wanted 
to work in it (Cling et al., 2007).
• Access to credit, which is a more general problem, 
is particularly restricted for young entrepreneurs.
• SSA tends to have more protective job security rules than
other regions (AfDB et al., 2014), especially Francophone
countries, where labour market rules are particularly rigid
(Cling et al., 2007). Very protective regulations typically
have the effect of favouring prime-age workers over youth
(Betcherman, 2015); however, it should be noted that the
overall impact of labour regulations in SSA is minimized 
by the region’s high degree of informality.

















This section reviews the literature on interventions to support
youth employment in sub-Saharan Africa. Overall, such inter-
ventions tend to focus on skills development for the wage sec-
tor. Far less attention has been paid to interventions intended
to enhance agriculture and micro-/household enterprises as
sources for youth employment despite the fact that most young
people in the region work in these sectors.15 As we have seen
in the previous section, the barriers young people face are
wide-ranging, encompassing both the supply and demand
sides. Accordingly, we adopt a broad approach to defining
youth employment programs, including some types of inter-
ventions that are outside the traditional scope of these pro-
grams. In our review, we have surveyed the information that is
available, from international organizations and both national
and international academics and research centres. Rigorous
impact evaluations of programs are relatively scarce, which
limits how definitively the effectiveness of the various types 
of interventions can be assessed.
3.1 Overview and categorization 
of interventions
Sub-Saharan Africa is a large and diverse region. We have seen
that the nature of employment and the challenges that young
people face vary in different country contexts. Within countries,
as well, the needs of youth are diverse. The better educated,
usually seeking formal wage employment, experience high
 levels of open unemployment while the less educated face
income and upward mobility challenges associated with
underemployment in agriculture, household enterprises, or the
informal wage sector. As well, there are particular groups —
e.g., the disabled, women, and internally displaced persons and
refugees — that are socially and economically marginalized and
especially vulnerable to shocks and market instability.16 For the
most part, these vulnerable youth groups do not receive special
programming attention in the region.17
Certain considerations came into play in defining “youth
employment programs” for the purposes of this paper. One
was to limit the review to post-formal-schooling interventions.
Although formal education is extremely important in deter-
mining youth employment prospects, covering the vast litera-
ture on formal education and its links with employment was
not feasible. We have also only touched upon product and
labour market regulations. While these rules (e.g., minimum
wages) can be potentially important factors in influencing
youth employment outcomes, our primary focus has been on
programs. Interventions have been included if youth are the
targeted participants, or are very important participants in a
non- targeted program. Finally, we have concentrated on pub-
licly-sponsored interventions, delivered by government or by
non-government or private sector actors in partnership with
government. However, we recognize that private actors, such
as corporations and foundations, are playing an increasingly
important role in sponsoring and independently delivering
youth programs. These efforts are not yet well documented
and should be addressed in future research studies.
Active labour market programs (ALMPs) constitute our
starting point. Almost all sub-Saharan African countries have
ALMPs which are either targeted at young people or have sig-
nificant youth participation. These interventions fall into three
categories: programs designed to increase labour demand for
youth; to improve the supply of youth labour and especially
skills; and to improve the intermediation (matching) between
supply and demand.
However, in the African context, it is important to take a
broad view of what constitutes employment interventions and
to go beyond ALMPs. Most active labour market programs are
intended to improve wage employment yet, as we have seen,
the majority of young Africans are not working in the wage
sector and this is not likely to change dramatically in the
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15 Some countries are beginning to shift focus. Ghana’s development strategy, for
instance, explicitly acknowledges the contribution of household enterprises to
employment and income growth (Fox and Filmer, 2014).
16 For instance, in a number of countries the level of unemployment among people
with disabilities is two or three times higher than that of people without disabili-
ties (UNECA, 2011).
17 Affirmative action programs have been the most common way of addressing dis-
crimination of different forms in some other regions. However, affirmative action is
not too prevalent in SSA, beyond South Africa. In South Africa, evaluation of affir-
mative action programs supporting blacks, women, and people with disabilities
found that programs had limited impact on reducing gaps in employment and
wages but narrowed differentials at the top of the wage distribution (World Bank,
2012).
 foreseeable future. The emphasis on ALMPs reveals a bias on
the part of policymakers towards the modern wage sector. It is
important to also consider interventions that are designed to
improve livelihoods for young people in agriculture, in self-
employment, and in household or micro-enterprises. These
interventions tend to be outside the normal boundaries of
youth employment policy. In its recent report on youth
employment in SSA, the World Bank highlighted a wide range
of measures (in addition to skills development) to improve
youth livelihoods: raising productivity in agriculture through
access to credit, land reform, and infrastructure; raising produc-
tivity in household enterprises through access to credit and
urban policy; and encouraging growth in the modern wage
sector through business climate improvements (Fox and
Filmer, 2014).
We have classified the employment interventions reviewed 
in this paper in the following five categories:
1. Employment creation, including interventions such as
public works programs and wage subsidies that create
or improve labour demand for youth;
2. Skills development and training, defined as initiatives
in non-formal education, vocational training, and health
that improve the human capital of young people;
3. Employment services, including job search assistance,
counseling, and placement designed to improve the
functioning of the labour market for youth;
4. Self-employment/entrepreneurship, including inter-
ventions to support self-employment and family/house-
hold-based enterprises; and
5. Agriculture, defined as interventions to support farm
initiatives and improve livelihoods in agriculture, as well
as to enhance related opportunities such as in agro-busi-
nesses.18
It should be noted that programs may offer multiple serv-
ices that can fit into more than one of these categories. These
types of interventions recognize that young people often face
multiple barriers in finding employment. There is some evidence
of multiple-service programs in SSA, most often incorporating
training into self-employment programs (Rother, 2007). How-
ever, they do not appear to be very common and certainly are
not as prevalent as in some other regions, especially Latin
America, with its Jovenes and successor programs.
The evidence suggests that skills development is the most
common form of intervention in the region, followed by sup-
port for young entrepreneurs (AfDB et al., 2012; Betcherman et
al., 2007). Direct job creation, primarily through large public
works programs, has been popular in some countries (e.g.,
South Africa and Kenya), but does not seem particularly preva-
lent overall. Employment services play a relatively minor role,
with most young people relying on informal networks to look
for work (Elder and Koné, 2014; AfDB et al., 2012). While agricul-
tural programs could potentially play an important role, espe-
cially in low-income countries, they do not appear to have
been widely used to improve youth livelihoods.
Information on youth employment programs in the region
is especially scarce when it comes to evidence on what works.
Of the 29 active labour market programs in SSA included in the
2007 Youth Employment Inventory, estimates of net impact
had been made for only two (Betcherman et al., 2007). Almost
certainly, the picture is no better for non-traditional interven-
tions to enhance livelihoods in agriculture and household
enterprises since these areas are still new and relatively
 unexplored in the sub-Saharan Africa context. This makes it
very difficult to assess the overall quality of different types of
interventions, or what is effective in terms of program design
and implementation.
18 Agriculture is an outlier of sorts in our categorization, as it is a sector and not a
type of intervention. However, since so many young people work in agriculture
and since traditional employment programs do not really include much of a focus
on the sector, we believe it is an important area to include in our review.
Most active labour market programs in the region focus 
on the wage sector, while most youth work in agriculture 
or micro-enterprise.
1. Employment creation, including interventions
such as public works programs and wage  subsidies
that create or improve l bour demand for youth;
2. Skills development and training, defined as
 initiatives in non-formal education, vocational
training, and health that improve the human 
capital of young p ople;
3. Employment services, including job search 
assistance, counseling, and placeme t designed to
improve the functioning of the labour m rket 
for youth;
4. Self-employment/entr pr eurship, including
in erventions to support self-employmen  and 
family/household-based enterprises; and
5. Agriculture, defined as interventions to support
farm initiatives and improve livelihoods in agricul-
ture, as well as to enhance related opportunities
such as in agro-businesses.18
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It is difficult to assess the quality of youth employment
 interventions, given the lack of rigorous program evaluation
and limited evidence available.
3.2. Evidence on interventions
This section provides a summary of the available evidence on
the five intervention categories introduced above. It highlights
where available, the nature of each intervention including its
objectives, targets, prevalence, and delivery mechanisms, and
what can be said in terms of an overall assessment of effective-
ness and usefulness in improving livelihoods for youth in  
sub-Saharan Africa.
Employment creation
Programs in this category include public works and wage
 subsidies. From a labour market perspective, the underlying
rationale for these programs is that the demand for youth
labour is insufficient and interventions can increase this
demand, at least in the short run. Public works programs
directly create employment, while wage subsidies provide
incentives to employers to hire targeted workers. Combining
employment creation programs with other services, particu-
larly training, can be an important feature when improving
longer-term employability is an objective. However, this does
not seem to be prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. Public works
programs are most often designed to provide a safety net;
improving employability is typically a secondary objective.
So targeting is usually oriented towards the poor. However, 
in some cases, such as South Africa’s Extended Public Works
 Program, youth can represent an important share of the
 participants (Oosthuizen and Cassim, 2014). Wage subsidy
 programs, on the other hand, often do have specific demo-
graphic targets, such as youth.
Public works. The international evaluation evidence suggests
that public works programs can be successful anti-poverty
interventions when they are well-targeted and administered
(Subbarao et al., 2013). However, the limited number of evalua-
tions does not show post-program labour market benefits such
as lower unemployment, higher earnings, or an easier transi-
tion to formal-sector jobs (Card et al., 2010; ILO, 2010;
 Betcherman et al., 2007; Betcherman et al., 2004). The most
likely explanation is that public works programs do not
develop skills that are needed in the labour market. As well,
there may be a negative stigma associated with participation.
A number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa have imple-
mented public works programs, both as an ongoing element
of the social protection system (e.g., South Africa, Ethiopia,
Senegal) or as a temporary intervention to mitigate the effects
of a shock like the food, fuel, and financial crises in the 2006-09
period (e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea). Although there have
been very few evaluations, the evidence for SSA seems to be
consistent with the international evidence; according to the
African Economic Outlook, public works programs are more
successful as a means of cash transfer than as a way of creating
employment (AfDB et al., 2012). Even where programs might
be regarded as successful in terms of job creation, they might
not be cost-effective. For example, an evaluation of a World
Bank and AfDB supported public works program in Senegal
found the average cost per job per day was US$37 in a country
where a large share of the population lives on less than 
US$2 per day (AfDB et al., 2012).
Although most studies have defined success for public
works (and other ALMPs) in terms of increasing employment
and/or earnings, these programs may have positive social
returns if they contribute to other goals, such as social cohe-
sion.19 Several SSA countries (e.g., Sierra Leone) have intro-
duced public works programs soon after conflicts have ended.
While rigorous evaluations have not been carried out, such
interventions that provide even short-term work for youth can
contribute to the rebuilding of society by offering young peo-
ple an alternative to participation in further conflict, by provid-
ing income, and by building infrastructure (World Bank, 2012).
Wage subsidies. These hiring incentives are often targeted at
youth, in recognition of the fact that young people face diffi-
culties in establishing a foothold in the labour market because
they lack on-the-job skills and experience. Indeed, these gaps
have been cited by SSA firms as the main reasons for not hiring
youth so, in that sense, there is a market-failure rationale for
subsidies to compensate employers for the risk and uncertainty
of hiring youth with no track record in the workplace.
Evaluations of wage subsidies, largely in developed coun-
tries, have shown that they can have a positive impact on post-
 program employment in general, and for youth in particular
(Kluve et al., 2006; Betcherman et al., 2007).20 However, it is not
clear that the overall employment impacts would remain posi-
tive if displacement and windfall costs were fully captured. It is
generally believed that these costs can be significant.21
19 This is one of the main messages of the World Development Report on Jobs, 
which contends that jobs can play a transformative role beyond improving living
standards and productivity, by also contributing to social cohesion 
(World Bank, 2012).
20 One issue particular to developing countries is whether the positive employment
effects of wage subsidies are due to the creation of additional jobs, or the formal-
ization of existing ones. In one of the few studies in a developing country, 
 Betcherman et al. (2010) find evidence to suggest that the latter factor was impor-
tant in the creation of employment through a wage subsidy program in Turkey.
21 Displacement costs occur where subsidized workers are hired at the expense of
non-targeted workers, who are either displaced or do not get hired. Windfall costs
refer to situations where hiring would have occurred even in the absence of the
subsidy. In both cases, wage subsidies may alter the composition of employment
in favour of the targeted group, but will not result in higher net employment.
Public works may be useful as anti-poverty strategies, 
but their contribution to employability is doubtful.
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Subsidies are an instrument that is essentially restricted to
formal wage sectors. Since these sectors account for only a
small minority of employment in most SSA countries, it is not
surprising that the region does not have much experience with
this type of incentive. One exception is South Africa where the
government has recently experimented with youth-targeted
wage subsidies. An evaluation of this program showed that
these subsidies induced firms to hire more young people,
although their total workforce did not increase because of sub-
stitution effects (Szirmai et al., 2013). A South African pilot
study of wage subsidies also yielded positive results for youth.
Comparing a sample of young people receiving a wage
voucher (to cover up to 50 percent of their wage for six
months) with a control group, researchers found voucher
recipients were significantly more likely to be in wage employ-
ment both one year and two years after having receiving it,
compared to those without vouchers. In this experiment, most
firms reported that the subsidy did not cause them to replace
existing workers with subsidized ones (Rankin, 2013).
Overall, the findings suggest that employment creation
through public works programs and wage subsidies have had
limited effect on youth. Public works programs have mostly
provided a short-term safety net with little evidence that they
offer a path to longer-term employment. Wage subsidies can
encourage hiring of young people but in countries with very
small formal wage sectors, their impact will be limited to a
fairly narrow segment of the youth workforce. It remains to be
seen whether the employment impacts of both public works
and wage subsidies can be enhanced with complementary
services, especially skills training.
Skills development and training
Skills development is the most common youth employment
intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. As noted earlier, we are
concerned in this paper with education and training programs
outside of the formal education system. These programs can
provide young people with vocational/technical skills, general
employability skills, and basic competencies and qualifications
that were not acquired in their formal schooling. A variety of
interventions fall into the skills development category: second-
chance education programs; classroom-based technical and
vocational education and training; workplace training; formal
and non-formal apprenticeship schemes; soft- and life-skills
training; and access to credit and financial incentives for
employers to provide workplace training.
Skills development programs have an important part to play
in improving the employment prospects of young people in SSA.
As we have noted, despite recent improvements in education,
many young people remain poorly educated, without the skills
to succeed in the labour market. Many studies talk about skills
mismatches, i.e., where educated youth do not have the com-
petencies required by employers (e.g., AfDB et al., 2012). Tech-
nical and vocational education is linked to higher employment
rates, especially in the formal sector. Skills development — in
both technical and non-cognitive or “soft” skills — is not just
important for the formal sector; it is also critical for the infor-
mal sector where most young Africans work and will continue
to work (Adams et al., 2013). Returns to technical education
and training may be particularly high in sub-Saharan Africa;
analysis by AfDB et al. (2012) found higher returns for voca-
tional training than for general secondary education in five 
of the eight countries studied.
Evaluations are too scarce for a rigorous assessment of the
effectiveness of training programs in the region. However, the
overall quality is considered to be weak. According to the AfDB
et al. (2012: 147), “[technical and vocational skills development]
systems in Africa suffer from a shortage of qualified staff, obso-
lete equipment, ill-adapted programmes and weak links with
the job market.” Much of the training that is available is oriented
towards white-collar jobs in urban areas, which represent a rel-
atively small aspect of total labour demand. The large numbers
of youth in rural areas have much less access to training oppor-
tunities (Adams et al., 2013).
The more extensive international evaluation literature sug-
gests a mixed record regarding the effectiveness of training
programs for youth. Card et al. (2010) conclude that classroom
and on-the-job training can have positive impacts on employ-
ment, especially over the longer run (e.g., after two years post-
training); however, they do find that youth tend to benefit less
than adults from these programs. Looking at youth training
programs, in particular, Betcherman et al. (2007) also find
mixed results, though impacts seem to be more positive in
developing than developed countries. A review by the Inter-
American Development Bank of their own youth training pro-
grams found slightly more positive results (Ibarraran and
Shady, 2009).
Returns on investment in technical education and training 
may be particularly high in sub-Saharan Africa, but quality 
is a concern.
Wage subsidies have been shown to have positive impacts 
on youth employment, but they are largely confined 
to formal wage sectors, and can have collateral effects 
on labour markets..
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One message of the evaluation literature is that private-
sector involvement can improve the success of training by
increasing the relevance of programs to the needs of the
labour market and, to some extent, by improving quality
through competition and innovation. There are various ways in
which the private sector — including employers, foundations,
and other actors outside government — can be a very impor-
tant stakeholder in providing skills training for youth in SSA,
either in partnership with government or alone. The literature
suggests that public-private partnerships can be helpful in
improving quality and access (UNECA, 2011). For instance, 
the Ghana Industrial Skills Development Centre is a public-
private initiative aimed at supplying demand-driven, industry-
responsive training to employees of sponsoring companies
and disadvantaged young people. This form of public-private
partnership need not be limited to just skilled trades and
industry: it can be replicated in the non-formal and community
education sector as well. Examples of such partnerships, 
however, are limited in the region.
The private sector can also sponsor and deliver training
independent of government programs. Of course, firms do
train their own employees, though it is not clear how much
employer-based training occurs in the region. Although a bit
dated now, Johanson and Adams (2004) concluded that the
private sector, especially large and foreign firms, made a far
larger contribution than governments to training in SSA. On
the other hand, according to the African Economic Outlook
report on youth employment, sub- Saharan African firms
 provide very little training compared to firms in other 
developing-country regions (AfDB et al., 2012).
New actors outside government are emerging players in
the skills development arena. For example, there are private
foundations, both African and international, that are sponsor-
ing new initiatives to create economic opportunities, and
youth are often a target group for these programs. There is
much to learn about these initiatives, documenting their
objectives, design, and effectiveness. We have not captured
these activities in this paper, but flag it as an area for 
future research.
The private sector is also involved in skills development by
 providing training through commercial institutes. The extent 
to which commercial trainers are used for the delivery of voca-
tional training varies by country. In some countries, government
provision of training is standard. In Uganda, on the other hand,
the majority of vocational and technical training is delivered by
private sector providers (such as commercial or faith-based
institutions, or NGOs). While the use of commercial trainers is
often preferred over public training institutions by policymak-
ers and donors, Atchoarena and Esquieu (2002) point out that
in SSA, private training institutions have not always had a better
performance. There can be a wide variation in the quality of
private trainers, especially if standards are not set and carefully
monitored.22 So, even where private delivery of skills develop-
ment programs is encouraged, governments still have a critical
role, providing regulatory supervision in addition to setting the
overall policy framework and funding (DFID, 2011).
Training for workers in the informal sector is obviously very
pertinent in a region where most people are employed in that
sector. Adams et al. (2013) conclude that workers in informal
employment are largely underserved by training opportunities
and that this situation needs more attention. This does seem to
be happening in some countries where there are growing
numbers of privately-run, unregistered, and small-scale non-
formal training outfits which are part of the informal sector
themselves. For instance, the Uganda Government has recog-
nized the need to develop skills in the informal sector as part
of the country’s Poverty Eradication Action Plan (Republic of
Uganda, 2014).
22 Atchoarena and Esquieu (2002) use (possibly dated now) examples of Botswana
and Lesotho to illustrate how government oversight can lead to high-quality
 private provision in the case of the former and a lack of standard setting to low-
quality trainers in the latter.











However, the main source of skills development for informal-
sector workers in SSA continues to be informal apprenticeships,
which have a long tradition in the region. In West Africa, infor-
mal apprenticeships account for about 90 percent of all train-
ing (Bertrand and Crepon, 2014). These occur mostly in small
informal firms in the form of private arrangements between a
master craftsman and the apprentice. There are many concerns
about how much skills development actually occurs in these
apprenticeships, partly because of the low level of education 
of most participants and partly because the content is often
limited to traditional learning (Adams et al., 2013). Several
countries, including Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, have now
introduced apprenticeship programs that integrate theoretical
learning with work experience (UNECA, 2011).
In a region where many young people have little or no
 education, or otherwise lack basic education and fundamental
skills, there is a strong rationale for second-chance programs.
These programs can be particularly needed in countries where
conflict has interrupted or ended schooling for many. Second-
chance programs include accelerated learning programs and
other non-formal education programs that focus on the acqui-
sition of basic skills such as literacy, oral expression, numeracy,
and problem-solving and may or may not lead to equivalency
qualifications. These programs are clearly important given the
strong connection between basic education and the capacity
to access and benefit from further training (Adams et al., 2013).
However, the costs of second-chance programs can be high,
and it is difficult to assess their cost effectiveness because of 
a lack of outcome data (Fox and Filmer, 2013).23
Overall, skills development programs are by far the most
popular intervention for supporting youth employment in sub-
Saharan Africa. Although evaluations of these programs inter-
nationally yield mixed results, vocational training and
second-chance programs must help to fill the gap in a region
where the formal education system has limited reach and
often is not strong on quality. Adams et al. (2013) identify a
number of priorities for improving programming in SSA. These
include giving more attention to training those in the informal
sector, moving away from supply-driven training to results-
based financing, creating incentives for training in small and
household enterprises, and using vouchers24 and other financ-
ing instruments to encourage competition and innovation in
the training sector. Other potential sources of innovation are
encouraging the engagement of private-sector actors in spon-
soring and providing training, using ICTs more in the delivery
of training, and exploring ways to draw on Africa’s large diaspora
to transfer skills to the region’s youth.25
Employment services
This category refers to services intended to improve the func-
tioning of the labour market through better intermediation
between job-seekers and employers. These include labour
market information and job search assistance (e.g., counselling
and placement). The rationale for these services is based on
information failures in the labour market. Traditionally, employ-
ment services have been directly provided by public employ-
ment agencies but, in many parts of the world, private
agencies are now important players.
The evaluation record of employment services, internation-
ally, is generally good. They tend to improve employment and
earnings prospects for participants and, since they are less
costly that other types of interventions, their cost-effectiveness
ranks well in comparison to other ALMPs (Kluve et al., 2006;
Card et al., 2010; Betcherman et al., 2004). However, the useful-
ness of employment services tends to be somewhat limited,
improving employment more for the skilled than the unskilled
(Kluve et al., 2006). They also are most appropriate for the for-
mal wage sector and have a smaller influence in countries
where much of the employment is in agriculture and self-
employment (World Bank, 2012).
Not surprisingly, then, employment services play a small
role in SSA countries. An experts survey in 37 countries in Africa
(SSA and North Africa) carried out for the African Economic Out-
look found that neither public nor private agencies were very
helpful in assisting young people: in only seven countries were
public agencies estimated to reach more than 50 percent of
young job-seekers and in only one did private agencies appear
to have this reach (AfDB et al., 2012). This is consistent with the
ILO School to Work Transition Survey, which found that
approaching family and friends was the favoured job-search
23 For a review of second-chance programs in a number of SSA countries, see Fox
and Filmer (2014: 81-82).
24 Vouchers have been used in the region, most notably in Kenya’s Jua Kali program.
The program has been largely cited as a success although researchers have identi-
fied negative impacts as well (Routman and McArthur, 2014).
25 For more on technology and the diaspora in improving youth skills and employ-
ment, see UNECA (2011).
There is a strong rationale for remedial and second-chance
programs in SSA, where many lack basic education and skills.
Skills development programs are by far the most popular
youth employment intervention type in the region.
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method for a majority of unemployed youth in six of the eight
participating countries. Fewer than 10 percent were registered
at an employment centre (Elder and Koné, 2014). Any coverage
by employment agencies is in urban areas. In Francophone
countries, virtually no young people register at employment
centres, even in the capital cities (Cling et al., 2007).
While formal job search methods and employment assis-
tance services may be rarely used by young people in SSA, this
does not mean that information failures are not a problem. Just
under half of the experts surveyed for the African Economic
Outlook ranked lack of labour market information as a challenge
for young people, although only a small percentage of young
people themselves rated lack of awareness of available jobs as
an issue (AfDB et al., 2012).
It is challenging to think about how traditional employment
services can be adapted to settings where the formal wage
sector is small and most opportunities are in agriculture, self-
employment, and household and other small enterprises. Cer-
tainly, better labour market information specific to youth is
important and there are some developments on this front,
including the Work4Youth (W4Y) partnership between the ILO
and The MasterCard Foundation in 28 SSA countries (ILO,
2013).26
Advances in ICTs can also open up new possibilities for how
young people search for work and how job- seekers and firms
are matched. The expansion of mobile phones in the region
can provide a basis for improving information and intermedia-
tion. Technology can also connect young people with employ-
ment opportunities in other countries and offers them a
chance of being employed in global markets without leaving
their home countries.27 A study published in 2010 by a private
American consulting firm identified four sub-Saharan countries,
Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal, and South Africa, among the world’s
top 50 destinations for offshore business (A.T. Kearney cited in
UNECA, 2011). While there is little evidence to show how active
employment or placement services are in this area, there is
potential to use some form of technology-based employment
services to connect youth with opportunities beyond their bor-
ders. To succeed in this emerging market, however, sub-Saha-
ran African countries need to ensure an effective regulatory
framework, and the necessary technological infrastructure.
Overall, the evidence shows that formal placement agen-
cies, both public and private, play a small role in the region’s
labour markets and, where they are effective, they largely focus
on more educated urban youth. There is a need for better infor-
mation and intermediation, so innovations in this area would
be advantageous. Exploiting the opportunities presented by
ICTs and globalization will be key.
Self-employment/entrepreneurship
Programs in this category aim to support young people in
starting a business or improving the performance of an exist-
ing household or micro-enterprise. These initiatives can
address two different objectives. One is poverty reduction,
with interventions that typically include some form of microfi-
nance, at times in combination with technical assistance. The
other is more entrepreneurial in nature, not primarily focused
on supporting basic livelihoods but rather helping more estab-
lished young entrepreneurs with the financial and technical
needs they may have to start and manage their own busi-
nesses. An example of the former category is the Micro-Enter-
prise and Credit Support for street-involved youth in Zambia,
while examples of the latter category are the Youth Entrepre-
neurship Development Program and the Youth Enterprise and
Capacity Building Program in Senegal.
The evaluation evidence on self-employment and entrepre-
neurship interventions for youth is very limited, especially in
developing countries. At the time they assembled and ana-
lyzed the Youth Employment Inventory, Betcherman et al.
(2007) identified only three self-employment programs in
26 The W4Y objectives are to create a global knowledge base that can expand oppor-
tunities for the youth and to help partner countries integrate this knowledge into
their national policies for better youth employment outcomes. The School to Work
Transition Surveys are part of this initiative. See
http://www.ilo.org/employment/areas/youth-employment/work-for-youth/lang--
en/index.htm 
27 One example is call centre employment in South Africa, which currently stands at
around 200,000. Policymakers are interested in how this work might employ disad-
vantaged people with limited alternative opportunities (Wade and Rogerson, 2014).
A.T. Kearney cited in UNECA, 2011.
Advances in mobile technology offer the potential for 
innovation in job search, recruitment, and matching services.
Formal placement agencies play a small role in 
the region’s labour markets and mainly serve the more 
educated urban youth.  
Support for youth entrepreneurship can be strengthened by
better targeting those most inclined to business success, and
with financial and technical support geared to youth.
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developing countries with net impact evaluations, one in
 Eastern Europe and two in Latin America. While the results
were generally favourable in identifying positive start-up and
income effects, cost- effectiveness and long-term impact were
in doubt. Although an extensive body of evidence is lacking,
most researchers agree on two factors that are important for
successful youth self- employment/entrepreneurship program-
ming (AfDB et al., 2012). One is targeting, since not all  young
people are inclined or suited to starting their own business.
The other is providing financing and technical support, since
both capital and know-how can be obstacles to young
 entrepreneurs.
Since the wage labour market in almost all SSA countries
generates very few jobs compared to the supply of labour,
many young people have little choice but to create their own
job. According to the School to Work Transition Survey (SWTS),
seven in ten young workers in the region are self-employed
(Elder and Koné, 2014). Most of these are undoubtedly in self-
employment or household enterprises as a source of basic
livelihood and do not have the entrepreneurial profile to sub-
stantially build up their businesses. However, there seems to 
be a considerable amount of true entrepreneurial potential
among African youth. According to the Global Entrepreneur-
ship Monitor, which is based on surveys in 73 countries, entre-
preneurial propensity and activity rates are high among youth
in most of the SSA countries included (Singer et al., 2015).
Where policymakers can identify young people with high
entrepreneurial potential and provide the support they need,
the social return could be considerable. Grimm et al. (2012)
identified a large group of what they call “constrained gazelles”,
which includes micro- entrepreneurs with similar profiles to
successful entrepreneurs who are constrained in some fashion.
The number one constraint for young Africans on starting,
sustaining, and expanding their businesses is the lack of capital.
The Elder and Koné (2014) study shows that most young peo-
ple start their own businesses with very little capital, drawing
on their own savings in most cases. Very few receive financial
assistance from banks or microfinance institutions for either
start-up or operating purposes. Yet, self-employed youth in all
countries included in the SWTS identified a lack of access to
financial capital as their main challenge to doing business.
Microcredit is a popular instrument in much of the develop-
ing world for providing access to financing for the self-employed
and small entrepreneurs. In some countries, such as Kenya,
funds have been set up to provide youth-led businesses with
loans. There has been very little serious analysis of microcredit
in sub-Saharan Africa but available research shows mixed and
inconclusive results (Bertrand and Crepon, 2014). In any event,
the actual impact of microcredit to youth in sub-Saharan Africa
is limited. We have already noted that few young people use
microfinance to start businesses. The demand for microfinance
in the region is much higher than the supply. And microfinance
institutions tend to lend to adults rather than youth, who are
seen as riskier clients because of their lack of experience as
borrowers and as entrepreneurs (Shah et al., 2010). Microfinance
products need to be adapted to the needs of young people if
they are to become a more relevant instrument. This might
include modifications in lending conditions and the provision
of training and counseling services to accompany the financial
assistance (Shah et al., 2010).
As noted above, a lack of skills and know-how can also be
an obstacle for young entrepreneurs. Therefore, the provision
of training services can be key to enabling youth to success-
fully start their own businesses. The Kenya Youth Business
Trust, for example, offers financial and technical support for
unemployed or underemployed young people between the
ages of 18 and 30 who have a valid idea for starting a business
(UNECA, 2011). Similarly, the Synapse Centre in Senegal has
been providing highly intensive, hands-on youth entrepre-
neurship training that combines traditional entrepreneurship
concepts with practical experience, personal development
retreats, and professional business consulting and mentoring
(UNECA, 2011).
A less frequently discussed obstacle is the regulatory envi-
ronment. Business regulations and urban policies may not
seem directly relevant to a youth self-employment strategy,
but they can matter. In this respect, many SSA countries have
been introducing reforms to improve the business climate,
which should support entrepreneurs, including youth. For
instance, according to the 2015 Doing Business Report, 
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sub-Saharan Africa accounted for the largest number of regula-
tory reforms for making it easier to do business. More than 
70 percent of the region’s countries had carried out at least one
reform (World Bank Group, 2015). Most of the reforms in SSA
are associated with reducing complexity and the costs of doing
business — for example, by reducing taxes and tariffs or by
reducing the time required to start a business, get construction
permits, or register property. All of these measures should
encourage young people to start and sustain or even expand
their own business.
Urban policies can also affect youth self-employment and
the success of micro- and household enterprises where most
young people in cities work. Yet the environment can be a very
negative one, because of formal policies or informal practices
(e.g., harassment of small vendors). Fox and Filmer (2014) iden-
tify a number of urban policy areas which can affect the entry
and productivity of micro/household enterprises: use of public
space; zoning regulations for private space; provision of urban
services; consumer protection; and tax and fee administration.
Authorities have many interests to balance in all of these areas
but supportive policies can make a significant difference for
young people trying to survive and succeed as entrepreneurs
in urban areas. Informal street trading, for instance, is a large
and rapidly growing form of entrepreneurship in SSA urban
areas. In Tanzania, Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa, street
 vendors have formed informal associations that engage and
negotiate with municipal authorities to be able to access
 formal training, finances, and infrastructure to support their
trade (Fox and Filmer, 2014).
Recent analysis also highlights how innovative new business
models such as technology advancement and value-chain
development in sub-Saharan Africa can encourage youth
enterprises. Mobile banking systems are a good example of a
new technology that has very quickly taken root among young
people who have used it as a means of employment by selling
airtime or pay-per-use phones. The private sector has played
an important role in encouraging the use of such technology
by providing technical assistance and technological expertise.
For example, challenge grant funds from the Department for
International Development in the United Kingdom helped to
develop the M-PESA in Kenya, a mobile phone-based banking
system, with the support of Kenya’s central bank (Fox and
Filmer, 2014). The ICT sector has been identified as a promising
sector in many SSA countries, so it is not surprising that several
initiatives are now being offered through various types of part-
nerships involving government, international agencies, univer-
sities, and companies (International Youth Foundation, 2013).
Given the scale of self-employment in SSA, its importance to
poverty reduction, and its entrepreneurial potential, programs
and policies directed towards self-employment and entrepre-
neurship should be an important part of youth employment
strategies in the region. Access to capital is the number one
barrier to be addressed. However, skills and know-how, as well
as a supportive regulatory environment, also matter. This
requires interventions that offer multiple services. Good pro-
gramming will require more evaluations in order to learn more
about what specific interventions can help young entrepreneurs
in a cost-effective manner.
Agriculture
Most young Africans work in agriculture and much of the
region’s poverty is concentrated in this sector. Programs to
help youth move into non-farm rural employment, especially
into agriculture-related businesses such as food processing
and distribution, can also play an important role. So can inter-
ventions that help young people make a transition into the
cities, something that many youth aspire to. But, ultimately, the
livelihoods of young people in the region will depend heavily
on improving the financial returns on farming.
The challenges are complicated since the low productivity
and incomes in the sector are due to a variety of factors includ-
ing the small scale of farms, uncertain land tenure, low-yield
crops, poor infrastructure, lack of mechanization, and low-skill
farming practices in general (World Bank, 2012; Fox and Filmer,
2014). Addressing these, and improving youth livelihoods in
agriculture in the process, requires a range of interventions
that fall well outside the traditional envelope of youth
 employment interventions.28
The future of youth livelihoods in agriculture has some par-
ticularly challenging aspects. Dwindling land resources, land
grabs, inheritance practices, limited profitability, and lack of
investment in technology and infrastructure are combining 
to push many young people out of agriculture or, at least, to
create reluctance to pursue agriculture-based livelihoods
(White, 2012; Sumberg, 2012). Changing perceptions of tradi-
tional employment and higher expectations also mean that
agriculture holds less attraction for many rural youth, who
want to transition to urban jobs and lifestyles.
28 However, Bertrand and Crepon (2014) do note that a number of randomized
experiments are now being carried out on agricultural interventions in the region.
Given the scale of self-employment in SSA, its importance to
poverty reduction, and its potential, entrepreneurial support
programs and policies should be central to youth employment
strategies in the region.
Actions in many areas will be needed to improve the poten-
tial of agriculture to provide better livelihoods for young people.
Fox and Filmer (2014) identify four priorities: skills, land policy,
credit, and infrastructure. Rural youth tend to be considerably
less educated than their urban counterparts. Those without
basic competencies will be unable to exploit opportunities
outside agriculture, either in rural non-farm activities or in
urban areas (Bennell, 2010). But better education will also
improve agricultural productivity and livelihoods, as a result.29
The acquisition of farming skills in SSA traditionally has been
hindered by the relatively limited effectiveness of agricultural
vocational training institutions and extension services. But
some program evaluations do show positive employment
effects of agricultural training programs (Bertrand and Crepon,
2014). And, there are more options now, including some prom-
ising programs. Junior Farmer Field Schools are examples of
such programs, introduced by the Food and Agriculture
 Organization (FAO). These programs assist the creation of
Youth Farmers Associations which in turn allow young people
to access markets and greater employment opportunities.
According to CTA (2012), they had benefited over 20,000
young men and women in 16 countries (CTA, 2012).
As we have already noted, land is a major issue for young
people, and increasingly so as Africa moves from being a land-
abundant continent to a land-scarce one. Rural youth depend
on family plots but these get sub-divided into smaller and
smaller parcels (Cling et al., 2007). The problem is exacerbated
where families do not have secure control over the lands they
farm. Interventions to alleviate this constraint primarily need to
focus on rural areas, but access to land for farming in urban
areas can also help. As part of the national action plan for
youth employment in Tanzania, youth groups have been
actively supported in major urban centers to legally own land
in green belts by allocating areas for youth infrastructure
development (Bennell, 2010).
Another major issue is access to credit for young farmers,
especially because they typically do not have sources of collat-
eral. Some countries in sub-Saharan Africa are attempting to
provide alternative forms of collateral to young farmers. 
An example of this is the OHADA30 Uniform Act on Secured
Transactions, in effect in 17 sub-Saharan African countries,
which allows young farmers to use assets such as movable
property and warehouse receipts as collateral (Fox and Filmer,
2014). It should be noted that some researchers have cau-
tioned against identifying youth as a distinct target group for
borrowing as separating them from the larger (and less riskier)
pool would make them even less attractive to financial institu-
tions (Fox and Filmer, 2014).
Finally, the provision of rural infrastructure and modern
technology can be a key element in creating opportunities for
rural youth (Bennell, 2010). Services such as transport, storage
facilities, and modern irrigation practices are essential in
attracting rural youth to agriculture and increasing their
 productivity.
Ultimately, agriculture will need a great deal of innovation
to keep young people in the sector and to ensure that liveli-
hoods through farming and related agribusiness activities
improve. Of course, the relationship goes both ways: the more
young people remain in agriculture, the more innovation that
will take place. Innovation can take the form of new seeds,
 fertilizers, and other methods (World Bank, 2012). It can also
occur through new products and markets, as well as new
opportunities further up the value chain in food processing
and distribution. For example, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania
have developed new export sectors for agricultural products
such as flowers, vegetables, and brand coffees. Public sector
involvement is a key to innovation. New products and markets
require coordination, which typically comes from government.
And, basic research into new agricultural varieties and tech-
niques, as a public good, mostly takes place in government
research centres or through government sponsorship. 
Sub-Saharan Africa does not have a strong record in this area
but there have been some effective research collaborations
that have led to improved varieties of cotton and cassava
(World Bank, 2012).
While the development of agriculture and related businesses
typically has not been seen as part of strategies to improve
youth employment, they are complementary goals in SSA. 
The future of young people in the sector is challenging in
many respects, as land availability dwindles, livelihood
prospects appear poor, and more innovative opportunities
seem to be in the cities. However, if interventions can help
young people develop the needed skills, access land and
credit, and upgrade infrastructure and technology, the future
could be more promising.
29 Although this may also result in increased migration of youth to cities since 
better-educated young people are more likely to migrate.
30 Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa
Land is a major issue for young people, especially as Africa
becomes land-scarce.
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The state of knowledge about youth employment in sub-Saharan
Africa has improved in recent years, but important gaps remain.
Analysis of the labour market situation of young people is con-
strained by data limitations that make it difficult to get reliable,
disaggregated estimates over time in many countries in the
region. The knowledge base on interventions is not strong
either in terms of identifying what has been tried or in deter-
mining how effective these measures have been. In this con-
cluding section, we identify areas where the evidence base is
weak and where future research could usefully inform inter-
ventions to improve economic opportunities for the region’s
youth. While the list below reflects our assessment of the major
gaps across the region, the relevance of the research topics will
depend to some extent on the country and the particular jobs
challenges it faces.
1. Data on youth employment. We have identified a number 
of areas where efforts to improve the data situation would
be very useful.31 The first is more regular representative
household surveys in most countries in the region. Efforts
by international organizations like the World Bank and the
African Development Bank to harmonize existing surveys
and to identify new sources of household data provide a
good start. Second, if enterprise survey data, which typi-
cally has focused on larger firms, could be extended to
smaller firms, especially in the informal sector, a much
clearer picture of the demand side of the labour market
would be possible.32 Third, and related to this, better data
on self-employment and entrepreneurial activity would
improve analysis of this category of livelihoods which is so
important for SSA youth.33 Fourth, there is virtually no
panel data, so it is difficult to capture the transition of
young people into the workforce (as noted below).
2. The school-to-work transition and youth employment
dynamics. Analysis of the years between school-leaving and
settling in the labour market is central to understanding
youth employment challenges, as well as for clarifying who
“youth” are for the purposes of employment (i.e., what ages
delimit the transition period). This, in turn, defines the optimal
age range for targeting youth employment programs.
 Analyzing dynamics during the transition period — 
i.e., movements between school and work, across labour
market states, and between jobs — can also be useful in
identifying the barriers young people face and thus the
types of interventions that would have the greatest impact.
A more robust analysis would require panel data, which can
be expensive to collect but can answer some questions that
cross-sectional data cannot. The School to Work Transition
Surveys have provided some very useful and relevant infor-
mation but these surveys are retrospective rather than
 longitudinal, only cover a handful of countries, and it is 
not clear if they will be repeated.
3. Employment for particular groups. One of the consequences
of the limited data is that much of the empirical evidence on
youth employment is aggregate and does not differentiate
between different types of young people. The most obvious
gaps pertain to gender, disability, and ethnic/tribal identities.
Understanding more about how employability, employment
experiences, barriers, and effective interventions differ
along these dimensions would fill an important and 
policy-relevant knowledge gap.
Knowledge gaps and areas for further research4
31 One exception is South Africa where the information base is much stronger than in
the rest of the region.
32 The World Bank Enterprise Surveys are one source of comparable firm-level data in
many countries but the sample does tend to be weighted to larger enterprises and
the employment of young people in particular is not covered. The ILO-MasterCard
Labour Demand Enterprise Surveys could be a useful addition to firm-level data.
33 The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor provides some data for a number of SSA
countries (with support from IDRC) on social values and individual attributes of
entrepreneurs, as well as entrepreneurial activity. However, its country coverage is
only partial, and data coverage has gaps including outcomes of entrepreneurial
activity as well as obstacles.
Important gaps remain in our knowledge about youth
employment in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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4. Structural change in employment. In other regions, most
notably East Asia, structural change toward higher-produc-
tivity industry and service jobs has been key to generating
better livelihood opportunities. Yet the structure of employ-
ment has changed very little in past decades in most SSA
countries. What has hindered this process in the region?
What is the potential for accelerated structural change in
the future, especially given the possibilities that may be
opening up in export-oriented light manufacturing? There
is not yet a consensus on these questions but they are very
relevant for understanding future labour demand patterns
in SSA and, thus, where employment opportunities will
exist for the region’s current youth cohort.
5. Program evaluations. The efforts to support youth employ-
ment through effective interventions are hampered by a
lack of evaluation evidence. To this point, few programs
have been rigorously evaluated in terms of impacts on the
employability, earnings, and other outcomes for partici-
pants. This seems to be changing somewhat as there are a
number of evaluations, including randomized control trials,
of programs in the region now. Building up an extensive
body of program evaluation evidence should be essential 
in any research effort.
6. Role of the private sector and other non-governmental
actors. There are a large number of new initiatives, spon-
sored by a diverse set of organisations, around economic
opportunities for SSA’s youth. These organizations include
private-sector enterprises, foundations, and NGOs and their
initiatives involve a wide range of funding arrangements,
partnerships (including public-private partnerships), and
delivery methods. This development offers the promise of
innovation but new challenges in gauging their success. It
is not easy to systematically document and assess the inter-
ventions sponsored by non-traditional actors, but getting a
better sense would help to flesh out the picture on inter-
ventions to support youth employment in the region.
7. Innovative programming. Our review has suggested a num-
ber of areas where knowledge generated by research could
inform innovative and effective programming. One priority
is to identify effective models for partnership, involving
governments, the private sector, civil society organizations,
local communities, and/or the donor community. As we
have emphasized in this paper, new initiatives involving
non-traditional actors are emerging in the region but there
is little evidence on their effectiveness and how they inter-
act with governments and public policy objectives. In terms
of programming, skills development is important in virtu-
ally all contexts in the region. In part, this is because of the
low educational attainment of many young Africans, which
calls for identifying effective approaches to remedial and
second-chance education. With the increased diffusion of
smartphones and related technologies across the region,
researchers need to understand how ICTs can be effectively
integrated into skills development and job search assis-
tance programs. 
For many young people, though, the major constraint to good
employment is a lack of prospects. So a key research issue
involves identifying interventions that can improve economic
opportunities available to youth. For example, what designs
for wage subsidies can create jobs for young people on a cost-
effective basis?  And, how can employment services improve
job possibilities for young migrants, both within countries 
(e.g., rural-to-urban) and for those seeking work in other SSA
countries and outside the region? However, for the foreseeable
future, many young Africans will have to create their own jobs
through self-employment or will pursue their livelihood in
agriculture. This suggests two research priorities that can
 generate very relevant knowledge for improving opportunities
for Africa’s youth. One is to determine the kinds of support that
will enhance prospects for young entrepreneurs. The other is
to identify interventions that can improve the return on
 agriculture and make the sector more innovative and produc-












According to survey evidence, the transition out of school in
sub-Saharan Africa largely occurs within the conventionally-
defined youth period (15-24 years of age). Data from household
surveys in 17 countries harmonized by the World Bank show a
steep decline in school attendance in these years, with only
about 10 percent still studying by the age of 25 (Figure A-1).34
It should be noted that the data used in this study, as well as
virtually all of the studies cited in this paper, are cross-sectional
so it is not possible to disentangle age-specific from cohort
effects.35 It is important to understand that the transition from
school to work is more blurred than Figure A-1 suggests since 
a lot of young people combine work (especially in agriculture)
and school during their teens. However, by age 20 when less
than a third of young people are still in school, only about 
20 percent are still both studying and working (Filmer and Fox,
2014: Figure 2.2).
Annex 1. Defining an appropriate age range for youth in SSA
Figure A-1: Percentage of age cohort in school
Source: Filmer and Fox (2014), based on data from the United Nations
World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision



























Primary or less Secondary Post-secondary
34 The years of these surveys varied depending on the country, with the most recent
ones in 2010. For more details, see the data annex in Filmer and Fox (2014).
35 For example, from cross-sectional data, we cannot tell whether the steep decline
in Figure A-1 is due to a large drop in school attendance as people get older (age-
specific effect) or to an increase in school attendance over time (cohort effect). 
If the former, we would expect to see the trend shown in Figure A-1 continuing in
the future; if the latter, we would see higher enrollment rates as the more recent
and better-educated cohort’s age.
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Not surprisingly, the transition into the labour market gen-
erally takes several additional years to complete after the tran-
sition out of school is over for most. Both the Gallup World Poll
Surveys analyzed for the African Economic Outlook and the
ILO-MasterCard Foundation School to Work Transition Surveys
(SWTS) provide some evidence on the timing of this process.
The Gallup World Poll data cover 39 African countries and terri-
tories (North Africa as well as SSA) between 2008 and 2010.
The year-by-year activities of young men and women are
shown in Figure A-2. By the mid-20s and through the late 20s,
some stability is apparent in the activity patterns. For young
men, the shares of the different categories of non-employment
and wage employment are no longer changing much,
although the share in vulnerable employment (own-account
self-employed and family enterprise workers) continues to
increase. For young women, the picture is similar except that
the share out of the labour force increases through the 20s,
presumably because of family-related reasons. Note that the
percentages of SSA females who have been married or had a
child rise steeply between 15 and 25 and then flatten out at
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Figure A-2. Activity patterns year-by-year
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Source: AfDB et al. (2012), based on Gallup World Poll Surveys in 39 SSA and North African countries and territories. 
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Relatively similar timing on the transition is evident in the
SWTS survey results. The SWTS was administered to 15-29 year-
olds in eight SSA countries in 2012-13 (Elder and Koné, 2014).
The analysis was based on three different transition characteri-
zations: “completed transition” to either a stable job or  a satis-
factory job/self-employment; “in transition” out of school but
unemployed or with a temporary or unsatisfactory job/self-
employment; and “transition not started” because of still being
in school or inactive and not looking for work. This framework
is interesting since it has a normative element in the sense that
a transition is deemed complete if the job is defined as satis-
factory by the individual and not only when someone has a
“good job” in conventional terms, which most in the region will
never get.36 The SWTS data show that over half of the 25-29
age group had completed the transition, although a significant
number had not (Table A-1).
On balance, these different data sources suggest that the
transition from education into employment does go on for a
number of years but, for most young people in sub-Saharan
Africa, it is completed or near completion by the mid-to-late
20s. By age 30, only a minority seem still not settled in terms 
of employment. This assessment may run counter to the
extended definitions of youth adopted by the African Youth
Charter and many governments in the region. It is true that it
can take quite a long time for a young person to find a job in
the modern wage sector, if that is the underlying criterion for
defining when the transition ends. However, for most young
people in SSA, a modern wage job is not a likely destination
and, as the ILO data show, when this is recognized in the calcu-
lations, transitions are more often completed in the 20s than
not. This conclusion is reinforced by data on other aspects of
the transition to adulthood. We have already noted that the
large majority of women have formed families by their mid-
20s; for males, it is closer to 30. And similar timing seems to
characterize citizenship patterns; for example, voting rates
increase steeply between the late teens and mid-20s and then
flatten out such that a 25 year-old is almost as likely to vote as
































transition transition not started
15-19 27.4 29.5 41.9
20-24 41.0 40.6 16.8
25-29 53.2 39.2 6.4
Table A-1: Transition states by age group
Source: Elder and Koné (2014), based on SWTS data in 8 SSA countries.
Source: Filmer and Fox (2014), based on Afrobarometer data
Figure A-3: Voting rates by age
36 Indeed, those who had completed their transition were much more likely to have
met the criteria via the “satisfactory job or self-employment” condition than the
“stable job” condition (Elder and Koné, 2014: Table A.16).
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